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SYMPOSIUM DISCUSSION GROUP REPORT
IS ITS IT? SOME CONCLUSIONS ABOUT
THE PANOPTICON
George J. Alexandert
As a "facilitator" of one of the small groups, I face a number of
problems in reporting our discussions. The main problem lies in the
expertise and conviction of the group. It included the Co-Director of
the Conference and the author of the paper decrying the panopticon
while suggesting that it is potentially descriptive of IVHS (now, it
appears, reborn as ITS'), to mention only the two authors whose ex-
pertise in the field was most intimidating to the author. Other mem-
bers, many with equally extensive backgrounds, should have made it
risky for the remainder, such- as the "facilitator", who are relative nov-
ices, to venture opinions. The final problem was that, despite that
fact, the group was quite vocal and often of several minds.
What follows is a report of major themes as I understood them,
with apologies for possible misunderstandings and misdescriptions of
opinions proffered as well as for the unwitting subordination of some
of the participants' opinions to my own point of view.
A. CONCERNS
The group began on a cantankerous note by questioning whether
there was sufficient information on which to base recommendations.
It noted that none of us had any experience with the implications of
perfect recall of even our own lives. We could only briefly grasp 'the
changes that would accompany our own ability to know such things in
complete privacy. We briefly noted how important it is to the life
experience we bring to this problem usually to be able to say, hon-
estly, that we cannot speak to one or another issue because we do not
have the requisite recall. If we had perfect recall, even assuming that
no one could access it but we ourselves, would we all be obliged to
help resolve issues in public and private litigation concerning events
t Professor of Law, Santa Clara University.
1. Intelligent Transportation Systems. The name change connotes an expansion of the
regulated field and, consequently, appears to magnify such privacy problems as exist.
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which we observed as disinterested bystanders? Would the police ex-
pect everyone at a crime scene to assist in the crime's solution? What
would happen to polite excuses for missing events we do not want to
attend? What, indeed, would happen to the very useful institution of
the "white lie"?2
If we project the concern about our relative innocence respecting
perfect memory to a system in which the data would be held by others,
can we even begin to speculate on its potential? If, further, one con-
siders the potential for amalgamation of all data available in separate
files, the possibilities become staggering.
The concern about our lack of experience led to some questions
about the extent to which ITS really would collect information not
already available (and, therefore, of sufficient value to attract private
capital). In part, some of us thought, the information may already
exist, redundantly, in the private banking, credit card, and telephone
records, not to mention far more revealing public records such as in-
come tax forms and social security data. Perhaps, some speculated,
what is presently missing is not additional data but adequate data
processing at affordable rates. This view is somewhat supported by an
article appearing in the Wall Street Journal shortly after the confer-
ence3 which suggested that a breakthrough in parallel processing was
just now making economic use of available data possible. One won-
ders how much travel related data would add.
In any event, our skepticism about the commercial utility of per-
sonal data did not harden us to ignore the possibility that ITS data
might, in fact, breach more privacy boundaries. We briefly discussed
the enormity of privacy problems arising from data already available.
The recent revelation that some employees of the Internal Revenue
Service had been browsing through tax returns of people they knew
demonstrated dramatically how all the data that is made available to
government makes possible invasions of private information from cas-
ual perusal. If the government were to make a concerted effort to
amalgamate all of the information about individuals it presently has in
separate files, it would create dossiers of unthinkable range.
2. Dr. Marvin Bressler, retired Chair of Sociology at Princeton University, is presently
writing a treatise on lying. My discussions with him have persuaded me that a serious case can
be made for lying being an essential optional form of communication in our society. This, of
course, does not argue for its indiscriminate use.
3. Using Computers to Divine Who Might Buy a Gas Grill, WALL St. J., Aug. 25, 1994, at
B1, Col. 3.
[Vol. 11
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B. SUGGESTIONS
1. In that light, some felt concerned that there was no general
set of accepted privacy-based limitations already in place which would
simply govern ITS as part of a broader scheme. We all shared the
view that collected information should generally not be aggregated
with information from other sources.
2. We recognized the potential for claims from many different
constituencies for individually identifiable ITS data to meet their own
needs and noted that some would be harder to ignore than others. For
example, at least one of us thought that such use in the interests of law
enforcement should be authorized because of the public priority given
to stopping crime. Many of us did not agree either with that specific
example or with others. Most of us thought that the information gen-
erated by ITS should, to the extent possible, be maintained only in
records not identifying individual users.
3. We thought there would be little objection to comprehensive
Congressional regulation of such problems. Even for portions of an
ITS system which were not federally funded, we thought that the Con-
stitutional authorization of federal power concerning interstate com-
merce4 would more than suffice to authorize federal standards for all
suppliers and users.
We thought that such regulations should prohibit use of any indi-
vidually identifiable data for purposes not directly and importantly re-
lated to ITS (except for the few who thought law enforcement should
also qualify). Consequently we thought that designing the system's
structure to operate on depersonalized data in the first place would
best accomplish that end. We had in mind the model of public transit
electronic cards which are purchased in one place and then provide a
passage at another without identifying the user. Of course, we have
not paid much attention to how such a system could be designed
mechanically but feel fairly certain that engineers would be able to
create an inexpensive device.
The system we suggest could handle even quite complex distinc-
tions among cars. For example, if it were important to classify vehi-
cles by their electronic equipment, their roadworthiness, their seating
capacity, or anything else, it should be possible to have a two step
process. In step one, the driver or owner would qualify the vehicle in
whatever manner required. At the end of the qualification process,
instead of providing a sticker or certificate, the state would supply a
token which entitled the driver of the vehicle to get access to the anon-
4. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
1995]
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ymous card-issuing machine. The token could be individuated to any
extent desired so long as the ultimate pass-granting machine recorded
nothing which would identify the individual driver or vehicle. The
pass-issuing machine could issue passes limited to certain uses,
speeds, destinations or whatever factors are of importance to the ITS
administration so long as the machine was not designed to read any
individuating data from the token and so long as the qualification itself
did not tend to identify the user.
4. Regulations governing the acquisition of information should
allow the release of user-identifiable information as sparingly as possi-
ble (not at all if possible). If information that identifies users is col-
lected, regulations should limit its retention to as short a period as
possible. Those provided access should be only those with a need to
know, and strong regulations should prevent further disclosure. it is
precisely because such safeguards have not always been successful in
the past that we favored placing privacy concerns directly in the de-
sign on information acquisition.
We noted, with great pleasure, that the conference and its discus-
sions, for once, preceded implementation. Often law is applied to
technological advances only much later in the process. We thought
that the early airing of issues would make it possible to design a sys-
tem that would raise fewer problems than one built with only effi-
ciency concerns as a guide. We particularly thought that the
government should be commended for providing this early opportu-
nity for these discussions.
[Vol. I11
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